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DE MINIMIS NON CURAT LEX
Max L. V.~ech * and Charles R. Moon t

AN age-old maxim often applied but infrequently rationalized is that

~ of de rninimis non curat lex. In the recent case of Steve Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery .Company,1 the United States Supreme

Court focused attention upon the doctrine by ruling that it should be
applied in determining whether "walking time" and other "preliminary
activities" constitute "work" for which employees are entitled to compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act of r938. 2 The so-called
"portal-to-portal" problems which have arisen as a result of the last
mentioned ruling make timely a discussion of the origin, meaning,
function and application of the maxim.

I
THE MAXIM, I TS ORIGIN AND FUNCTION
The maxim is variously stated 8 and variously translated 4 in treatises and reports: One of the earliest English collections of maxims in

* A.B., J.D., University of Michigan.
t A.B., J.D., University of Michigan.
1

Decided June 10, 1946, 328 U.S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187.
52 Stat. L. 1060, 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 201 et seq.
8
De minimis non curat le~, BROOM, LEGAL MAXIMS, 10th ed., 88 (1939);
BoUVIER's LAw D1cTioNARY, 3d rev. 8th ed., 2130 (1914); SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 6th ed., 476 (1920). In the civil law it is often stated Mhvhna nan curat
Praetor, I DERNBERG, PANDEKTEN 326, note 5 (1902); or De- mimmis non curat
Praetor, AuGOSTINI BARBOSAE, TRAcTATUS VARII 102 (1644); TRAYNER, LATIN
· MAXIMS AND PHRASES, 2d ed., 137 (1876). The historical source of the maxim is
demonstrated in its statement as Minima res non dat rest-ituuonem in ALBERICI DE
RosATE ,BERGOMENs1s, D1cT10NARIUM JuRISTAM C1viLis, QuAM CANONIC! (Venice,
1581).
4
"The law doth not regard trifles," BRANCH, PRINCIPIA LEGIS ET AEQUITATUS,
1st Am. ed. from 4th London ed., 36 (1824); "The law does not concern itself
about trifles," BRooM, LEGAL MAXIMS, 10th ed., 88 (1939); MoRGA.N, LEGAL MAXIMS,
3d ed., 55(1878); "The law takes no account of trifles," SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE,
6th ed., 476 (1920); ''The law does not notice or concern itself with trifling matters," BoUVIER's LAW D1cTIONARY, 3d rev. 8th ed., 2130 (1914).
2
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which this maxim is included states it as, de minimis non curat lex and
translates it, "The law doth not regard trifles." 5 Later translations
frequently use the verb "concern" instead of "regard." 6 Although it
may appear to be an unimportant distinction, it is believed that the
subsequent discussion will show that the translation using the verb
"regard" more truly expresses the real purpose and use of the maxim.
The translation of the maxim using "concern" was a source of much
humor to a writer in the Albany Law Journal 1 in I 8 80 who discusses
many cases in which the law obviously did very much concern itself
with trifles, generally not mentioning the maxim. Cases are cited, for
instance, where the issue hinged on the meaning of one word or upon
the presence or absence of a punctuation mark, or, as he laughingly
points out, "a hair from the head of the prophet Mohammed." Actually, in every rase in which th,e de minimis maxim is cited or applied,
the law is concerning itself with what is found to be or alleged to be a
trifle. These trifles, however, are not regarded as being a worthy basis
for a decision or other action by the court.
The maxim was not known as a maxim in the Civil Law until about
the Fifteenth Century. Instances in which its principle has been applied
to particular problems can be found as far back as Callistratus,8 and
Ulpianus and Paulus,9 in writings compiled in Justinian's Digest; but
in the list of rules in condensed form contained in the Digest neither
de minimis nor a variation of it was included. 10 One of its earliest appearances as a, maxim was in I 644 11 in Augustini Barbosae's book of
15
BRANCH, PRINCIPIA LEGIS ET AEQUITATus, 1st Am. ed. from 4th London ed.,
36 (1824).
6
See note 4, supra.
1
Rogers, "De Minimis Non Curat Lex," 21 ALBANY L.J. 186 (1880).
8
D.4.I.4. With regard to restitutio in integrum, an action whereby the Praetor
could relieve minors and others from bargains legally binding but inequitable, Callistratus stated that the action should not be granted if the amount involved is insignificant
or the matter unimportant. See the translation in 3 ScoTT, THE CIVIL LAW 55
(1932). See also I MoNRo, THE DIGEST OF JusTINIAN 201 (1904).
9 D.4.III.9-1 I. With regard to the same action referred to in note 10, supra,
it was said that the action ought not to be granted indiscriminately; "for instance ..•
if the amount involved is insignificant, Paulus, That is to say, not over two aurei,
Ulpianus, It should not be granted." 3 ScoTT, THE CIVIL LAW 71, 72 (1932);
I MoNRo, THE DIGEST OF JusTINIAN 220 (1904).
,
Another example may be found in D.18.I.54, where it was stated by Paulus: "Res
bona fide uendita, propter minimam causam inempta fiere non debit. See 5 ScoTT,
THE CIVIL LAw 18 (1932).
10
11 ScOTT, THE CIVIL LAW 297-318 (1932).
.
11 A collection published a few years earlier is by Alberici De Rosate Bergomensis,
supra, note 3, in which appears the statement "Minima res non dat restitutionem."
This is, of course, not as broad a statement of the maxim.

\
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maxims, Tractatus Varii, where it was stated as de minimis non curat
Praetor and quad Praetor non curat de minimis. From these beginnings
modern writers in Civil Law now state the maxim as we know it.12
The development of de minimis in the Common Law followed a
similar pattern. Bracton, writing in the Thirteenth Century, discussed
situatiol}s in which the principle of the maxim was applied, but the
maxim was not stated as such.13 Coke, writing in the Sixteenth and
Seventeenth Centuries, stated the principle in its present day form, 14 but
he apparently did not yet regard it as a maxim.15 In the Eighteenth
Century Blackstone used the maxim as an independent principle of law,
as it is now used. 16 The earliest collection found in which the maxim is
included is by Thomas Branch, and was published in the United States
in I 824.11 Since that time the use of the maxim has increased steadily in
all courts and the :field of its application has steadily broadened.18
One of the earliest reported English cases in which the maxim was
stated and applied in its present form is that of York v. Y ork,19
digested in Viner's Abridgement as holding:
"No action lies of a waste but to the value of a penny; for
de minimis non curat lex." 20
An even earlier case is translated in the Selden Society Year Book Series
in which waste was charged for cutting three ash trees and two sallows.
The court is reported to have held:
12

2 R1ccoB0No, Nuovo DmEsTO ITALIANO 548 (1937).
I BRAcToN, DE LEGIBUS, Twiss ed., 69 (1878), (I. 1, fol. 9); and 4 id. 607
(1878) (1.4, fol. 316).
14
COKE, SECOND INSTITUTE, c. 5, P· 306.
15
CoKE, FASc1cuLus FLoRUM or A HANDFUL OF FLOWERS (1618). This little
volume lists many rules and maxims but does not include de minimis non curat lex, or
its variations, among them.
16
2 BLACKST. CoMM. 262; 3 BLACKST. CoMM. 228; 4 BLACKST. CoMM. 36.
17
BRANCH, PRINCIPIA LEGIS ET AEQUITATis, 1st. Am. ed. from 4th London ed.
(1824). Other early collections of maxims which do not include de mimmis non curat
lex are: NoY, THE PRINCIPAL GROUNDS AND MAXIMS, 2d Am. ed. from 9th London
ed. (1824); also id., 1st Am. ed. from 7th London ed. (1808); id., 1st London ed.
(1642); FRANCIS, MAXIMS OF EQUITY, 1st. Am. ed. (1823); WINGATE, .MAXIMES oF
REASON (1658).
18
ln F.A.D. Andrea, Inc. v. Dodge, (C.C.A. 3d, 1926) 15 F. (2d) 1003 at
1005, the court ~id, "H-0wever, it is the growing policy of the law not to take notice of
trifling matters. ·'De minimis non curat lex' is a maxim which has greater force today
than ever."
19
Y.B. 9 Henry 6, p. 66 b (1431).
20
22 VINER's ABRIDGEMENT 458 (1745). In the margin is this note, "and by
Anderson, if Judgment had been entered, it had been Error; for the Value of Waste
shall be to 40 d. at the least. Noy 4. Thore vs. Thomas." (Y.B., 42 Edw. 3, 13.)
13
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"The waste in this case is too.trifling for us to adjudge it waste
and so entitle the plaintiff to have recovery of the place wasted;
for strictly speaking, to cut down sallows which will grow again
is not waste." 21
·
Whether or not the actual wording of the maxim was used does not
appear from the original report in legal French or its translation. This
use of the principle of the maxim in waste cases is noted by Bracton 2 z
who lived and wrote in the reign o~ Henry III. 28
•
Thus far in the English cases the maxim had been used only in
wasty situations. The next step was for someone to make use of the
precedent thereby created in another fact situation. In The Case of the
Mines, 24 in the argument of counsel, this step was taken. This was a
case between Queen Elizabeth and the Earl of Northumberland involving the ownership of certain mines located beneath lands owned by
the Earl. The Queen claimed that all gold and silver mines belonged
to the Crown and supported this claim by producing many commis- .
sions and leases from the ancient records. in which the ownership of
such .mines by the Crown, irrespective of ownership of the overlying
land, was expressly or impliedly recognized. The Earl contested this
claim, relying principally upon the defense that these particular mines
were copper mines, although they did contain some gold and silver,
and, therefore, belonged to him as landowner, or, in the alternative,
that at least the copper in these mines belonged to him. Counsel for
the Earl thus sought to distinguish between a copper mine containing
gold and silver and a gold and silver mine containing copper. Their
argument was as follows:
" ..• And therefore where an action of wast is given for wast
done to the disherison, &c. yet it has been held that if the wast
done is but of the value of 2d. the plaintiff shall no.t have judgment, for de minimis non curat lex, and this is not within the
words or intent of the Act.25 And so in the said commissions or
leases of base mines, in which ·aliquid auri vel argenti habetur, the
intent of the King and of the words are, where the gold or silver is
worth more than the base mine, or at least is equivalent to the
whole charge of getting it, for otherwise it shall not destroy the

·-

21

p.

Ap,on, Y.B.; 8 Edw. 2, Wast.

11,

Case I (1315), Seldon Society Y. B. Series,

121.
22

4

28

I KENT CoMM., 2d ed., 499, 500
I Pl. Rep. 310, 75 Eng. Rep. 472

DE LEGIBUS, Twiss ed., 607 (1878), (I.4, fol. 316).
(1832). Henry III, 1216-1272 A.D.
24
(1568).
25
Statute of (_:;loucester, 6 Edw. 1 (1278).
BRAcTON,
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thing of greater value. So that they are only to be taken in this
sense, viz. where there is a great plenty of gold or silver in the
mines .•.." 26
The Court of Exchequer held for the Queen as to ownership by
the Crown of gold and silver mines. As to the other issue, it held that,
since the Earl had admitted in his pleadings that there was gold and
silver in the mines but had not pleaded the quantity of gold and silver,
it must be presumed that it was in a substantial quantity. The mines,
therefore, were the property of the Crown.
The case usually cited in the collections of maxims, in connection
with de nunimis, is Taverner v. Domiwum Cromwell. 21 This case involved, among other things, the question of whether or not a copyholder could have a prescriptive right to cut trees on copyhold land.
In deciding this question the court is reported to have said:
"For the second, they held the prescription good. For Walmsley said there is a difference between a prescription for freehold
land and for customary land; for custom which concerneth
freehold ought to be throughout the county, and cannot be in a
particular place.. ,• . But .a prescription concerning copyhold land
is good in a particular, for de nunimis non curat lex, and the law
is not altered thereby, and it may be there is but one copyholder
there, for which he might prescribe; and Beaumond agreed to this
difference, and custom to have profit a prender, privilege, or
discharge, may very well be in a particular, and by Owen it was
ruled accordingly in Collis's case in the Queen's Bench." 28
~

earlier case, Foiston v. Crachroode,29 had held that a copyholder could not prescribe against the lord either in the lord's name or
in the copyholder's own name, but he had to allege a "custom." However, the copyholder could allege the "custom" to be for one copyholder to have common of estovers in the lord's wood, even though he
could not claim prescription which would have to be in his own name.
Taverner, in his case, had prescribed for one copyholder only, but
not by name. The court spoke of custo·m and said that as to copyhold
land custom may be particular. The court was in effect circumventing
the rule against prescribing against the lord, and was allowing a parI Pl. Rep. 310 at 329, 75 Eng. Rep. 472 (1568).
Cro. Eliz. 353, 78 Eng. Rep. 601 (1594). Except Branch, who, in his collection, cites the Case of the Mines, I Pl. Rep. 310, 75 Eng. Rep. 472 (1568). See
discussion, supra.
28
Cro. Eliz. 353, 78 Eng. Rep. 601 (1594).
29
4 Co. Rep. 31 (b), 76 Eng. Rep. 962 (1587).
28

27
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ticular practice to be called a "custom" in the manor, although it was
not a true "custom" which would be as to all copyholds in the manor.
The court thus applied the de minimis doctrine to avoid a technical
application of the law pertaining to copyholders and prescriptions.
In these three early examples of the use of the maxim, in three
different situations, it was used as an interpretive aid. In the waste
situation de minimis was used to determine when that which we would
now call a statutory right of action arises. In the mines case use of
de minimis was proposed for the interpretation of a phrase appearing
in ancient leases and commissions. In the copyhold case de minimis '
was used to circumvent a too literal application of a common law rule
of property. This early development of the maxim indicates that it
is a rule of reason, a substantive rule that may be applied in all courts 80
and to all types of issues.31
The writers of treatises and compilations support this conclusion.
Thus, in Broom's Legal Maxims,3 2 the maxim is cited and discussed in
_the section entitled "The Mode of Administering Justice." Salmond
says concerning the maxim:
"The law takes no account of trifles. This is a maxim which
relates to the ideal, rather than to the actual law. The tendency
to attribute undue importance to mere matters of form-the failure to distinguish adequately between the mate.rial and immaterial-is a characteristic defect of legal systems. See § rn." 38
Section

IO

is ·as follows:

"Another vice of the law is formalism. By this is meant the
tendency to attribute undue importance to form as opposed to substance, and to exalt the immaterial to the level of the material. It
is incumbent on a perfect legal system to exercise a sound judg80
The maxim de minimis non qurat lex or abbreviations thereof appeai; in the
reports of a great many cases. In many it is the basis for the decision of the court, in
others it is found not applicable, and in still other cases, the maxim is merely cited as
an additional argument or to illustrate a point in dictum. Frequently the reference to
the maxim is so brief that it does not find its way into the headnotes of the cases, or
the digest, or other indices which makes it difficult to -discover all the cases in which
the maxim may have been used. See cases cited throughout this article.
81 "Criminal law, as well as civil, honors the maxim, De minimis non curat
lex••••" United States v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., (D.C. Ohio 19u) 194 F. 234 at
250. ": . . the Powers of a court of equity are not to be called into exercise to consider
matters of trifling amount, or to recover nominal damages." Cummings v. Barrett, IO
Cush. (64 Mass.) 186 at 190 (1852); Swedish Evangelical Lutheran Church v.
Shivers, 16 N.J. Eq. 453 (1863).
82
10th ed., c. 3, § 2 (1939).
88 SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE, 6th ed., 476 (1920).
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ment as to the relative importance of the matters which come
within its cognisance; and a system is infected with formalism in
so far as it fails to meet this requirement, and raises to the rank of
the material and essential that which is in truth unessential and
accidental. Whenever the importance of a thing in law is greater
than its importance in fact, we have a legal formality. The formalism of ancient law is too notorious to require illustration, but
we are scarcely yet ii{ a position to boast ourselves as above reproach in this matter. Much legal reform is requisite if the maxim
De minimis non curat lex is to be accounted anything but irony." 84
In Latin for Lawyers the maxim de minimis is stated and translated, and is then related to another maxim:
"Boni judicis est lites dirimere (4 Co. 15).-It is the duty of
a good judge to prevent litigation.ns 5
In California the maxim is part of the Civil Code,86 "The law disregards trifles." It is one of thirty-three Maxims of Jurisprudence
enacted into the code in 1872, preceded by the following heading:
"The maxims of jurisprudence hereinafter set forth are intended not to qualify any of the foregoing provisions of this code,
but to aid in their just application." 87

,,

It is significant that not once, from the earliest Roman times to the
present, has any court, including those which have refused to apply the
maxim in the case before them, expressed any doubt as to its right to
use the maxim in an appropriate case. Whether the court be applying
a constitutional, statutory or common law rule of law, it has felt empowered to interpret that rule with the aid of de minimis non curat lex.
So, although there are no cases which expressly determine the power of
the court to use de minimis, the many, many cases in which it has been
used must by implication be determinative of the existence of this power
in the court.88
The function of the maxim is, therefore, as an interpretive tool
to inject reason into technical rules of law and to round-off the sharp
Id. 25.
LATIN FOR LAWYERS, 2d ed., 146 and 130 (1937).
86
Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) § 3533·
87
Cal. Civ. Code (Deering, 1941) § 3509.
88
So far as "portal-to-portal" problems under the Fair Labor Standards Act are
concerned, the power to apply de minimis is, of course, specifically determined by the
decision in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, 328 U.S. 680, 66 S. Ct. 1187
(1946). The Supreme Court of the United States in that case expressed no doubt as
to ti!e applicability of the maxim to these problems.
84
85
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corners of our legal structure. It is not a mere rule of damages,89 and
for this reason it is asserted that the translations of the maxim which
. use the word "regard" are more descriptive qf the principle embodied
in the maxim than the translations which use the word "concern."

II
FACTORS CONSIDERED IN APPLYING MAXIM

It is readily apparent that a principle which has reasonableness as
its ultimate end cannot be easily defined. It cannot be said that six
cents, six inches or six. minutes is ·de minimis, apart from a specific
fact situation. ):'he tolerances allowed in constructi1_1g a hand pump of
the type often seen in farm yards cannot be used in making a syringe
for use by a physici:in. As, one author has said, "No precise criterion
exists to determine what is the minimum the law will notice. . . ." 40
The cases in which de minimis is used cannot, therefore,· be readily
reconciled, and, since identical fact situations rarely occur, there is
seldom direct precedent _to be applied in a new case.41 It is, for this
reason th~t the historical origin and development of the maxim is important. In the absence of a controlling authority arising out of a
similar fact situation, the only help that can be gotten from tp.e many
cases in which de minimis has been used is an indication of certain factors which have been considered by the courts in applying or refusing
to apply de minimis.
The cases in which the.maxim is applied and discussed, the cases in
which · the maxim is applied but not discussed and the cases in
which the maxim is neither applied nor discussed, divergent and· irre89

Fullam v. Stearns, 30 Vt. 443 at 455 (1857): "The maxim de minimis non
curat lex, I apprehend, whenever it is applied correctly to take away a right of recovery,
has reference to the injury, and not to the resulting damage."
But see Eller v. Railroad, 140 N.C. 140, 52 S.E. 305 (1905), and see infra, p.
560.
,
4.-0W. T. HUGHES, TECHNOLOGY OF LAW 56 (1893). It is put ~ore prettily by
w. F. FOSTER, LATIN MAXIMS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW C?MPILED AND TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH VERSE 15 (1924).
1
"' Ungrich v. Shaff,' ll9 App. Div. 843, 105 N.Y.S. 1013 (1907), quoted infra,
p. 549. This paucity of direct precedent was noted, with some impatience, by the district court in its opinion on rehearing filed February 8, 1947 in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, (D.C. Mich. 1947) 69 F. Supp. 710. The best precedent this
court could find were rulings of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division
[W. H. MAN., 1944-1945, pp. 234, 242, 1193; 5 W. H. REP. 148 (1942)] and
three court decisions: Wallihg v. Peavey-Wilson Lumber Co., Inc., (D.C. La. 1943)
49 F. Supp. 846; Cameron v. Bendix Aviation Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1946) 65 F. Supp.
510; Buelow v. Connor Lumber and Land Co., (Wis. I 944) I I Lab ,Cas. 1f 63, 220.
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concilable as they sometimes are, reveal at least an underlying uniform
understanding as to the function of the maxim and as to the factors to
be considered in using it.
A. Purpos'e. Probably the most important of the factors is the
purpose behind the statutory phrase, contractual clause, or common
law rule sought to be interpreted and applied. For example, in
Manchester Mills v. Manchester 42 the court was considering a petition
to abate a tax levy under a statute which allowed abatement where the
tax was unjust in comparison with taxes on other property. The question was as to the-admissibility of evidence and ·the extent of an investigation to be allowed or required as to the taxes on other property. The
court said:
"· .. The question is, Does justice require an abatement? It is
a broad and comprehensive inquiry, not to be restricted by artificial, arbitrary, immutable rules, inconsistent with substantial
justice which the statute was designed to secure. The investigation must have reasonable limits. Unlimited, in point of time and
subject matter, it might produce the injustice of litigation unreasonably protracted. The maxim, de minimis non curat lex, may
properly be applied in this class of cases. The justice to be administered is to be sufficiently exact for the practical purposes of the
legislature, who did not intend to invite the parties to a struggle
for costs, or a ruinous contention about trifles." 43
Another example is found in United States v. Hocking Valley Ry.
Co. 44 Counsel .for the defendant argued against the government's
construction of the word "discrimination" in the statute 45 by pointing
out that it would promote a multitude of small suits and petty criminal
prosecutions against the railroad. The court felt that de minim-is would
be adequate protection against this possibility, saying:
"We see no occasion for alarm that the construction which defendant's counsel contend against may involve the carrier in a
maze of complaints involving matters of little consequence in
which one shipper may complain that he is not receiving precisely
and exactly the same detailed consideration which he thinks his
competitor is obtaining. Criminal law, as well as civil, honors the
maxim, 'De minim.is non curat lex,' which has controlling application to the enforcement of a statute which aims at the repression
of real and substantial abuses in transportation of a kind known
42

58 N.H. 38 {1876).
Id. at 39.
44
(D.C. Ohio 1911) 194 F. 234.
45
Elkins Act of 1903, 32 Stat. L. 847, 49 U.S.C. (1940) § 41.

45
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and appreciated- by all in the business as well as by the general
public."~
~ (D.C. Ohio 1911) 194 F. 234 at 250. Similar use of de minimis is made in
French Guiana, 2 Dods. 151, 165 Eng. Rep. 1445 (1817). Other examples of the
use or discussion of the de minimis principle as an aid in statutory interpretation are:
The Reward, 2 Dods. 265, 165 Eng. Rep. 1482 (1818), a classic case, discussed in
BROOM, LEGAL 1'1IAXIMS, 10th ed., 89 (1939), as follows: "Where trifling irregularities
or even infractions of the strict letter of the law are brought under the notice of the
Court, the maxim de minimis non curat lex is of frequent practical application. • • •
So, with reference to proceedings for an infringment of the revenue laws, Sir. W. Scott
observed that 'the Cqnrt is not bound to a strictness at once harsh- and pedantic in the
application of statutes. The law permits the qualification implied in the ancient maxim,
de minim-is non curat lex. Where there are irregularities of very slight consequence,
it does not intend that the infliction of penalties should be inflexibly severe. If the
deviation were a mere trifle, which, if continued in practice would weigh little or nothing on the public interest, it might properly be overlooked.' "
This ~tatement is cited and relied on in Re Opening of Oneida Street, 37 App.
Div. 266, 55 N.Y.S. 959 (1899); Bristol-Myers Co. v. Lit Bros., 336 Pa. St. 81, 6 A.
(2d) 843 (1939). See generally, Industrial Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 64,
45 S. Ct. 403 (1925); In re Blount, (D.C. Ark. 1906) 142 F. 263; Consolidated Gas
Co. of N.Y. v._Newton, (D.C. N.Y. 1920) 267 F. 231; In re United Light & Power
Co.~ (D.C. Del. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 217; State v. Watts, 48 Ark. 56, 2 S.W. 342
(1886); Wilkerson v. State, 13 Mo. 91 (1850); People v. Richmond, 5 Misc. 26,
25 N.Y.S. 144 (1893); Springfield Road, 73 Pa. St. 127 (1873); State v. Railway
Companies, 128 Wis. 449, 108 N.W. 594 (1906); Hernulewicz v. Jay, 6 B. & S. 697,
122 Eng. Rep. 1352 (1865). Numerous cases discuss de minimis in connection with
the commerce question in cases under the NLRA: NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601,
59 S. Ct. 668 (1939); NLRB v. Suburban Lumber Co., (C.C.A. 3d, 1941) 121 F.
(2d) 829; NLRB v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 133 F. (2d) 295;
and the FLSA: Mabee v. White Plains Pub. Co., 327 U.S. 178, 66 S. Ct. 5q (1946);
Goldberg v. Worman, (D.C. Fla. 1941) 37 F. Supp. 778; Gerdert v. Certified
Poultry & Egg Co., Inc., (D.C. Fla. 1941) 38 F. Supp. 964; Hooks v. Nashville
Breeko Block & Tile Co., (D.C. Tenn. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 369; Muldowney v. Seaberg
Elevator Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1941) 39 F. Supp. 275; Drake v. Hirsch, (D.C. Ga. 1941)
40 F. Supp. 290; Rauhoff v. Henry Gramling & Co., (D.C. Ark. 1941) 42 F. Supp.
754; Tucker v. Hitchcock, (D.C. Fla. 1942) 44 F. Supp. 874; Walling v. Mutual
Wholesale Food & Suppiy Co., (D.C. Minn. 1942) 46 F. Supp. 939; Ling v. Currier
Lumber Co., (D.C. Mich. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 204; Spier v. Gulf Coast Beverages,
(D.C. Fla. 1943) 50 F. Supp. 653; Brown v. Minngas Co., (D.C. Minn. 1943) 51 F.
Supp. 363; McKeown v. So. Cal. Freight Forwarders, (D.C. Cal. 1943) 52 F. Supp.
331; Daly v. Citrin, (D.C. Mich. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 876; McDaniels v. Clavin,
(Cal. 1942) 128 P. (2d) 821, 22 Cal. (2d) 61, 136 P. (2d) 559 (1943); Horton v.
Wilson & Co., 223 N.C. 71, 25 S.E. (2d) 437 (1943); Brooks Packing Co. v. Henry,
192 Okla. 533, 137 P. (2d) 918 (1943). De minimis has been used in place of the
"Scintilla Rule": Offutt v. World's Columbian Exposition, 175 Ill. 472, 51 N.E. 651
(1898); Campbell v. Everhart, 139 N.C. 503, 52 S.E. 201 (1905). It is also discussed in patent and copyright infringement problems: Mathews Conveyor Co. v.
Palmer-Bee Co., (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 135 F. (2d) 73; Hoffman v. LeTraunik, (D.C.
N.Y.,1913) 209 F. 375; Stork Restaurant v. Marcus, (D.C. Pa. 1941) 36 F. Supp.
90; Northhill Co. v. Danforth, (D.C. Cal. 1942) 51 F. Supp. 928.
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On the other hand, when construing attachment statutes, tax
statutes and similar statutes having forfeiture features, statutes which
are by tradition strictly construed, it is found that de minimis is used
sparingly 47 or not at all.48 This rule is interestingly stated in Walton v.
47
Attachment: Hightower v. Handlin & Venneys, 27 Ark. 20 (1871); Huntington v. Winchell, 8 Conn. 45 (1830); Douglass v. Mainzer, 40 Hun (47 N.Y. S. Ct.)
.75 (1886); McKinney v. Reader, 6 Watts (Pa.) 34 (1837); Paul v. Slason, 22 Vt.
231 (1850); 44 A.L.R. 168 at 184 (1926).
Tax: In general de minimis is used more frequently and generously in testing
validity of tax assessments than in testing validity of tax sales. Maish v. Arizona, 164
U.S. 599, 17 S. Ct. 193 (1896); Rothschild v. United States, 179 U.S. 463, 21
S. Ct. 197 (1900); Lumaghi Coal Co. v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 8th, 1942) 124 F. (2d)
645; O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23 Cal. 287 (1863) (sale case: see later California cases
under note 49, infra); Gilbert v. New Haven, 39 Coiin. 467 (1872); Thatcher v.
The People, 79 Ill. 597 (1875); City of Chicago v. Wilshire, 238 Ill. 317, 87 N.E.
383 (1909); Dwinel v. Soper, 32 Me. 119 (1850); Workman v. Worcester, II8
Mass. 168 (1875); Coleman v. Shattuck, 2 Hun (6 N.Y. S. Ct.) 497 (1874); People
ex rel. Jessup v. Kelly, 33 Hun (40 N.Y. S. Ct.) 389 (1884); Hetfield v. Plainfield,
46 N.J.L. 119 ( l 884); Love v. Spur Independent School Dist., (Tex. Civ. App. 1940)
143 S.W. (2d) 793; Kelley v. Corson & Richardson, 8 Wis. 182 (1859); Baxter v.
Faulam, 1 Wils K.B. 129, 95 Eng. Rep. 532 (1746); 44 A.L.R. 168 at 185 (1926);
97 A.L.R. 842 (1935); 147 A.L.R. 1141 at u43 (1943).
Other Statutes: B. & M. White Laundry Co. v. Railway Co., 83 S.C. 209, 65 S.E.
239 (1909), (penalty for failure to pay claim without suit); Christian v. Fry, 108
Colo. 394, II8 P. (2d) 459 (1941), (improper fee for appeal costs).
48
Attachment: Boyd v. Page, 30 Me. 460 (1849); Thayer v. Mayo, 34 Me.
139 (1852);. Glidden v. Chase, 35 Me. 90 (1852); Grqsvenor v. Chesley, 48 Me.
369 (1859); Pickett v. Breckenridge,•22 Pick. (39 Mass.) 297 (1839); Chenery v.
Stevens, 97 Mass. 77 (1867); Downward & Co. v. Jordan, 7 Pa. Dist. 273 (1898);
44 A.L.R. 168 at 184 (1926).
Tax: Most of these cases involve validity of tax sales. Fallbrook Pub. Utility Dist.
v. Cowan, (C.C.A. 9th, 1942) 131 F. (2d) 513; Lumsden v. Erstine, 205 Ark. 1004,
172 S.W. (2d) 409, 147 A.L.R. n32 at l 143 (1943); Treadwell v. Patterson, 51
Cal. 637 (1877); Axtell v. Gerlach, 67 Cal. 483, 8, P. 34 (1885); Boston Tunnel Co.
v. McKenzie, 67 Cal. 485, 8 P. 22 (1885); Huse v. Merriam, 2 Me. 375 (1823);
Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12 (1867); Burroughs v. Goff, 64 Mich, 464, 31 N.W. 273
(1887); Wells v. Burbank, 17 N.H. 393 (1845); Lufkin v. City of Galveston, (Texas
1889) II S.W. 340; 44 A.L.R. 168 at 185 (1926); 97 A.L.R. 842 (1935); 147
A.L.R. n41 at n43 (1943).
Other Statutes: Smith v. Bank of Enterprise, 148 Ala. 501, 42 S. 551 (1906),
(satisfaction of mortgage statute); Lindsay-Strathmore Irr. Dist. v. Superior Court, 182
Cal. 315, 187 P. 1056 (1920), (judge's interest in suit before him); State v. Green,
37 Mo. 466 (1866), (holding trial into-Sunday); State ex rel. Cook v. Fidelity and
Deposit Co., 91 W. Va. 191, II2 S.E. 319 (1922), (jurisdictional amount of controversy); Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1877), (impairment of obligation of
contract); Frisbie v. United States, 157 U.S. 160, 15 S. Ct. 586 (1895), (criminal
prosecution for excessive attorney fee); Regina v. Illidge, 2 Car. & K. 871, 175 Eng.
Rep. (1849), (criminal prosecution for forgery); Bruner's Appeal, 57 Pa. St. 46
(1868), (action to surcharge executor).
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Moore 49 where the court, in answering the contention that a seven cent
excess in interest charged at a tax sale was de minimis, says:
"From the case of Shylock vs. Antonio, reported at large by
Shakespeare, down to the last volume of Oregon reports, the
courts have held that statutes providing for a forfeiture shall be
strictly c_onstrued, and far be it from this court to say that a sum
of money coined by the government of the United States, which
under certain circumstances it is a penitentiary offense to steal, and
which is sufficient to furnish bread to the hungry, cheering drink
to the thirsty, and to the miser the means of contributing to charity, shall be treated as unsubstantial in a case of this character." 50
In the field of contract construction de minimis is frequently used. 51
A typical example is the early New York case of Turley v. Insurance
Company. 52 This case involved the construction of a fire insurance
policy provision requiring, on the proof of claim, the certificate of the
magistrate or notary living nearest to the fire. The court said:
"This clause of the contract of uisurance is to receive a reasonable interpretation; its intent and substance, as derived from the
language used, should be regarded. There is no more reason for
claiming a strict literal compliance with its terms than in ordinary
contracts. Full legal effect should always be given to it, for the
purpose of guarding the company against fraud or imposition.
Beyond this, we would be sacrificing substance to form-following words rather than ideas.
"It seems the residence of a notary happens to be a few feet
nearer the fire than the office of the Judge, and we are asked to go,
into nice calculation of distances, and settle the point upon the
law of mensuration. De minimis, etc., is a sufficient answer to this
objection. The spirit of the condition requires no such mathematical _precision from the assured. Its object is completely secured
by the proximity of the certifying magistrate." 53
49

58 Ore. 237, II3 P. 58 (19u); rehearing den., 58 Ore. 241, 114 P. 105
(19u).
50
58 Ore. 237, at 243.
51
ln Kenyon v. Western Union Tel. Co., 100 Cal. 454, 35 P. 75 {1893), the
court said, " .•• and in general, where a contract right is violated, the maxim de minimis non curat le:it has no application, and nominal damages will be given ••. ," but even

in this case, the court refused to reverse the judgment for failure to give these nominal
damages. Contra, Campbell v. Cottelle, '38 R.I. 320, 95 A. 665 (1915).
52
25 Wend. (N.Y.) 374 (1841). Followed in Paltrovitch v. Phoenix Inc. Co.,
(N.Y. S. Ct. 1893) 68 Hun. 304, 23 N.Y.S. 38.
58
25 Wend. 374. at 377.
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Similar generous use of de minimis in construing contracts is generally made,5¾ the extent of the application being governed largely by
what the parties to the contract seemed to regard as significant.cs 5
With respect to what might be regarded as common law rules ( although they are now sometimes restated in statutes) de minimfs is also
frequently discussed in relation to the purpose of the rights and obligations created by the rules. Ungrich v. Shaff{l 6 was a suit for specific
performance of a contract to purchase land. The defendant refused to
complete the purchase because a wall below the surface encroached
r to I.¾ inches for 54 feet and a loose stone retaining wall encroached
up to 5 ip.ches for 46 feet. The court said:
"There can, of necessity, be no fixed rule for determining the
extent of an encroachment necessary to bring any particular case
outside the rul~ De minimis non curat lex, since the facts in each
case are invariably different, and the test to be applied is to consider whether the encroachment is substantial enough to seriously
interfere with the use and enjoyment of the premises. Each case
must be determined upon its own merits."
The court 0en concluded,
". . • neither of the en_croachments complained of was sub1 stantial enough to justify the vendees in refusing to complete their
contract, ..• The case, as already indicated, it seems to me, comes
within the rule, De minimis non curat lex." 57

In defining the rights and obligations of riparian owners de minimis non curat lex is used in a manner which is especially indicative of
H Building contracts: Flannery v. Rohrmayer, 46 Conn. 558 (1879); Beers v.
Wolf, u6 Mo. 179, 22 S.W. 620 (1893); Smith v. Gugerty, 4 Barb. (N.Y.) 614
(1848); Van Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 N.Y. 571, 29 N.E. 1017 (1892); Cassino v.
Yacevich, 261 App. Div. 685, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 95 (1941). Miscellaneous contracts:
F.A.D. Andre, Inc. v. Dodge, (C.C.A. 3d, 1926) 151 F. (2d) 1003; Guscetti v. Dugan,
60 Cal. App. 187, 212 P. 397 (1923); Pollak v. Danbury Mfg. Co., 103 Conn. 553,
131 A. 426 (1925); Lees. Lee, 191 Ga. 728, 13 S.E. (2d) 774 (1941); Sheldon v.
Eakle, 160 Ill. App. 282 (19u); Horr, Warner & Co. v. Hawkhurst, 7 Ohio Dec.
Rep. 168 (1876); Milligan v. Marshall, 38 Pa. Super. 60 (1909); Rixey's Admr. v.
Moorehead, 79 Va. 575 (1884); Helmholz v. Greene, 173 Wis. 306, 181 N.W. ZZl.
(1921); Whitcher v. Hall, 5 B. & C. 269, 108 Eng. Rep. 101 (1826).
'55 In Davis v. Sabita, 63 Pa. St. 90 (1869); speaking of a six inch reservation in a
plat, the court says, "Nor can courts disregard reservations expressly and carefully made
· for a purpose not unlawful, on the principle of de minimis." Id. at 94.
56
II9 App. Div. 843, 105 N.Y.S. 1013 (1907).
57
Id. at 1014. See also, Valentine v. McGrath, 4 Alaska 102 (1910), (court of
equity denied injunctive relief on ground of de minitmis, but granted leave to file suit
for damages); Perkins v. Raitt, 43 Me. 280 (1857); Duhain v. Mermod, Jaccard &
King J. Co., 73 Misc. 423, 131 N.Y.S. II (19u).
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the importance of the purpose factor in using the maxim. In an often
quoted statement Chancellor Kent said:
" ... Streams of water are intended for the use and comfort of
man; and it would be unreasonable, and contrary to the universal
sense of mankind, to debar every riparian proprietor from the application of the water to domestic, agricultural, and manufacturing purposes, provided the use made of it be made under the limitations which have been mentioned; and there will, no doubt,
inevitably be, in the exercise of a perfect right to the use of the
water, some evaporation and decrease of it, and some variations in
the weight and velocity of the current. But de minimis non curat
lex, and a right of action by the proprietor below, would not necessarily :flow from such consequences, but would depend upon the
nature and extent of the complaint or injury, and the manner of
using the water. All that the law requires of the party, by or over
. whose land a stream passes, is, that he should use the water in a
reasonable manner, and so as not to destroy, or render useless, or
materially diminish, or affect the application of the water by the
proprietor.s below on the stream. He must not shut the gates of
his dams, and detain the water unreasonably, or let it off in unusual quantities, to the annoyance of his neighbour." Ga
This emphasis upon the reasonableness of the exercise of the riparian
rights, before considering the amount of water used, again illustrates
that the principle of de minimis is a substantive rule of law.
Frequent mention of de minimis is made in cases of technical trespass where the defense of insignificant or nominal damage only is
raised. Some courts have in this situation announced that,
"This maxim is never apP.lied to the positive and wrongful
invasion of another's property."!i9 ·
GS 3 KENT CoMM., 2d ed., 440 (1832). See also Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353,
155 Eng. Rep. 579 (1851); Marshall v. Peters, 12 How. Pr. 218 (1856); Sparks
Mfg. Co. v. Newton, 57 N.J. Eq. 367, 41 A. 385 (1898); Paterson v. E. Jersey
Water Co., 74 N.J. Eq. 49, 70 A. 472 (1908); Roberts v. Martin, 72 W. Va. 92,
77 S.E. 535 (1913).
G9 Seneca Road Co. v. Auburn Rochester R.R. Co., (N.Y. 1843) 5 Hill 170 at
175. The origin of this rule is often attributed to Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938,
92 Eng. Rep. 126 (1702), where -the majority of the court dismissed a suit for
damages for denial of right to vote by application of de minimis. On appeal to the
House of Lords the majority of the court was reversed, [1 Bro. P.C. 62; 1 Eng. Rep.
417 (1703)], thereby adopting the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Holt. See also
Reeves v. Jackson, 207 Ark. 1089, 184 S.W. (2d) 256 (1944); Hartman v. Tresise,
36 Colo. 146, 84 P. 685 (1905); Wartman v. Swindell, 54 N.J.L. 589, 25 A. 356
(1892); Elicottville and Great Valley Plank Road v. Buffalo and P.H. R.R. Co.,
20 Barb. (N.Y.) 644 (1855); Blashfield v. Empire St. T<rl. and Tel. Co., (N.Y. S. Ct.
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The basis for this strictness in these cases, of course, is also the
purpose behind common law rules of trespass, i.e., protection of one's
peaceable possession of his property and the prevention of the acquisition of adverse rights by prescription.60
In other words, it becomes apparent that the "trifles" which the
courts "regard," or do not "regard," are not only measured in cents,
seconds, inches, etc., but are measured in terms of the purpose behind
the rule of law sought to be interpreted and in terms of the injustice
that may be done by a strict and technical application of that rule. The
"regard" must receive at least as much emphasis as the "trifles" if the
courts are to reach a reasonable result 61 and administer substantial
justice.62
B. Practicality. Not only do the courts consider the purpose of,
or policy behind, rules of law in applying de minimis, but they also
consider another form of policy which really includes public convenience and necessity, private convenience and just plain everyday
practicality. One example of this is found in the references by the
United States Supreme Court, in the Mt. Clemens case, to "the realities of the industrial world" and "the actualities of working conditions.."68 4Jmost every case in which the de minimis doctrine has been
used has this factor in it. This factor and the "purpose" factor arise out
of the endeavor to make rules of law workable through the application of the maxim. To that extent, the cases discussed herein under
"Purpose'' are pertinent here also.
Another example of consideration by a court of the "practicality"
1892) 18 N.Y.S. 250; Adler v. Met. El. Ry. Co., 18 N.Y.S. 858 (1892); Moore v.
N.Y. El. Ry. Co., 4 Misc. 132, 23 N.Y.S. 863 (1893); Grunzfelder v. lnterborough
Rapid Transit Co., 164 App. Div. 928, 149 N.Y.S. 437 (1914); Atty. General v. The
Lombard and South Street Pass Ry. Co., (Pa. Common PI. 1874) l Wkly. N.C. 489;
Bell v. Ohio & Pa. R.R. Co., (Pa. 1854) 1 Grant 105; Campbell v. Cottelle, 38 R.I.
320, 95 A. 665 (1915); Webb v. Portland Mfg. Co., (C.C. 1838) 3 Sumn. 189.
00
This is emphasized by the technical trespass cases in which de minimis is applied. Cummings v. Barrett, IO Cush. (64 Mass.) 186 (1852) and Purdy v. Manhattan Elev. Ry. Co., (N.Y. City and Co. Common Pleas 1891) 13 N.Y.S. 295, where
injunction was refused on ground of de minimis non curat lex although a technical
trespass. Fenlon v. Western Light & Power Co., 74 Colo. 521, 223 P. 48 (1924);
Shafer v. King, 82 Colo. 258, 259 P. 1042 (1927); Knight v. Abert, 6 Pa. St. 472
(1847); Paul v. Slason, 22 Vt. 231 (1850); Middleton v. Jerdee, 73 Wis. 39,
40 N.W. 629 (1888). See also stream cases, supra, note 58.
61
3 KENT CoMM., 2d ed., 440 (1832); Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353, 155
Eng. Rep. 579 (1851).
62
Meeks v. Carter, 5 Ga. App. 421, 63 S.E. 517 (1909); York v. Stiles, 21 R.I.
225, 42 A. 876 (1899); Ramsburg v. Kline, 96 Va. 465, 31 S.E. 608 (1898).
88
The full statement is quoted in the text, infra, p. 564.
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factor is found in Hernulewicz v. Jay 64 where the validity of a clause
in a deed of arrangement by a debtor was the issue. This clause provided that if funds for a dividend to creditors became available before
all creditors had assented to the deed or had proved their claims, sufficient funds would be set aside to pay these non-assenting creditors,
upon request by them in writing. The court held that this provision
was not unreasonable or burdensome, saying:
"The obj.~ct of the statute was to work out the distribution of
the effects of insolvents among their creditors, which it would be
impossible to do if we were to hold that any trifling differences of
this kind would vitiate a composition deed. The maxim de minimis non curat lex is applicable h~re." 65
-

'

There is a large group of cases, illustrative of this factor, involving
the use of de minimis in connection with requests for new trials and
with appeals based upon technical errors by a trial court or a jury.
Typical of these cases is Wolff v. Prosser 66 where a partition decree
erroneously provided for distribution of $ IO to a person not a party to
the proceedings. The court said:
"We think this is a proper case for the' application of the
maxim, de minimis etc., and that the error was without substantial
injury." 61
·
Behind these cases 68 is both public convenience and private convenience, and the desire to promote the practical and speedy adminis64 6 B. & S. 697, 122 Eng.. Rep. 1352 (1865). See also In re Blount, (D.C. Ark.
1906) 142 F. 263; Springfield Road, 73 Pa. St. 127 (1873); Doremus v. City of
Paterson, 73 N.J. Eq. 474, 69 A. 225 (1908).
65
6 B. & S. 697 at 1354, 122 Eng. Rep. 1352 (1865).
66
73 Cal. 219, 14 P. 852 (1887).
61
Id. at 220.
68
Wilson v. McEvoy, 25 Cal. 169 .(1864); Bustamente v. Stewart; 55 Cal. II5
(1880); McAllister v. Clement, 75 Cal. 182, 16 P. 775 (1888); McDougal v. Fuller,
148 Cal. 521, 83 P. 701 (1906); Brady v. Ranch Mining Co., 7 Cal. App. 182, 94 P.
85 (1907); Meeks v. Carter, 5 Ga. App. 421, 63 S.E. 517 (1909); Jensen v. Chicago
G. W. Ry. Co., 64 Minn. 5u, 67 N. W. 631 (1896); Spunner v. Roney, 122 Ill.
App. 19 (1905); Brackway v. McClun, 148 Ill. App. 465 (1909); Buettner v. Polar
Bar Ice Cream Co., (La. App. 1944) 17 S. (2d) 486; Palmer v. Degan, 58 Minn. 505,
60 N.W. 342 (1894); Hopkins v. Kitts, 37 Mont. 26, 94 P. 201 (1908); Campbell v.
King, 32 Mo. App. 38 (1888); Hackworth v. Zeitinger, 43 Mo. App. 32 (1891);
Paxson v. St. Louis Drayage Co., 55 Mo. App. 56.6 (1893); Cameron v. Hart, 57 Mo.
App. 142 (1894); Cameron Sun v. McAnaw, 72 Mo. App. 196 (1897); Corbett v.
Spring Gardens Ins. Co., 85 Hun 250, 32 N.Y.S. 1059 (1895); McGregor v. Harm,
19 N.D. 599, 125 N.W. 885 (1910); Ritchie v. Shannon, 2 Rawles (Pa.) 196
(1828); Ley v. Huber, 3 Watts (Pa.) 267 (1834); York v. Stiles, 21 R.I. 225, 42 A.
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tration of justice. It is just not good common sense to encourage or
allow further litigation at an expense in excess of the most that can be
gained. As one court said, "We shall not order a play that is not worth
the candle." 69
The great number of these cases of appeal for technical error, and
the almost universal expression of the error in monetary terms, has
given rise to the tendency to associate de -minim.is with monetary
values.10 However, the cases already discussed herein must show that
monetary value is not the sole criterion for application of the maxim.
In the technical trespass cases the presence of a continuing right which
might be.cut off by prescription prevents or drastically limits the application of de -minimis,11 irrespective of monetary values. In other
situations also, the presence of a question of importance beyond the
monetary values will limit or prevent the use of de -minim.is, irrespective of monetary values. Thus, in Ballin v. L. A. County Fair 12 the
plaintiff claimed $3.70 as his winnings on a $2.00 pari-mutuel bet at
the race track. The defendant had tendered him $3.60, the difference
representing opposing theories on the proper computation of "breakage" as defined in the statute authorizing the betting. The court found
that the plaintiff's method of computation was correct and refused to
sustain a judgment for defenda.n:t on the basis of de -minim.is saying,
"The tule of de -minim.is, on which defendant relies, will be
applied to such cases only where an award of a nominal amount
will not carry costs and no question of right is involved.111 • • •
876 (1899); Wallace v. First Nat. Bank, (Texas Civ. App. 192,2) 246 S.W. 737;
Ellis v. National City Bank, 42 Tex. Civ. App. 83, 94 S.W. 437 (1906); Ramsburg
v. Kline, 96 Va. 465, 31 S.E. 608 (1898); Bond v. Davis, 48 W. Va. 27, 35 S.E.
889 (1900); Haas v. Prescott, 38 Wis. 146 (1875); McKone v. Met. Life Ins. Co.,
131 Wis. 243, 110 N.W. 472 (1907); Phillips v. Green, 288 Ky. 202, 155 S.W.
( 2d) 841 ( I 941). Cases of this type are discussed at length in Clark v. Mason, 264
Ky 683, 95 S.W. (2d) 292 (1934~. See also 44 A.L.R. 168 at 174 to 184 (1926).
69
Van Gorder v. Sherman, 81 Iowa 403 at 405, 46 N.W. 1087 (1890). See
also Rixey's Admr. v. Moorehead, 79 Va. 575 (1884).
·
70
In the annotation, 44 A.L.R. 168 (1926), the annotator says: "Certain general
observations may here be made: First that the maxim operates in courts of law only
where no right other than to recover money is involved .•••" The annotator himself
cites some, cases which do not support this observation and many more can be cited.
It is submitted that this annotator has mistaken the evidentiary means of demonstrating
the factual existence of a trifle in some cases, with the end sought to be obtained by the
~~

11

.

Supra, notes 59, 60.
72
4"3 Cal. App. (2d) 884, 11i P. (2d) 753 (1941).
78
Wilson v. McEvoy, 25 Cal. 169 (1864), (partially contra on costs); Payne v.
Stevens, I Ga. App. 266, 57 S.E. 916 (1907); Davis v. Haugen, 133 Minn. 423, 158
N.W. 705 (1916); Hensel v. Noble, 95 Pa. St. 345 (1880).
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Moreover there is here involved the construction of a statute on a
matter which is doubtless of interest to many persons, and for this
reason also the maxim referred to should not be applied." 74
Any remaining doubt that monetary value is but one form of evidence used to establish the presence of the "practicality" factor should
be dispelled by the case of Wilkerson v." The State 1~ where no money
was involved and where de minimis was the ground for upholding an
indictment in which the defendant's name was spelled Wilkinson.
The "purpose" factor seems to say that a litigant is entitled to
"substantial justice." The "practicality" factor says that he is entitled
to no more than "substantial justice." The picture of, de minimis is
thus beginning to take shape.
C. Intent. In everyday life one is always more ready to excuse
an innocent mistake than one made intentionally or through carelessness. It is natural, therefore, to expect that courts in using a flexible
tool such as de minim-is will consider the factor of "intent." In this
discussion "intent" is used not only in the crime and fraud sense,76 but
it also includes honest intent,77 implied intent,18 negligence 79 and in74
43 Cal. App. (2d) 884 at 887, III P. (2d) 753 (1941). The same problem
arises and the same result is reached in Feeney v. Eastern Racing Assn., 303 Mass. 602,
22 N.E. (2d) 259 (1939). De minimis does not alone prevent attack on constitutionality of an act, Schwartz v. Essex County Bd., 129 N.J.L. 129, 28 A. (2d) 482
(1942).
76
13 Mo. 92 (1850).
16 Smith v. His Creditors, 59 Cal. 267 (1881); Pearson v. Pearson, 230 N.Y.
141, 129 N.E. 349 (1920). See cases, supra, note 60.
71
Johnson v. Jaqui, 27 N.J. Eq. 552 (1876); Mitchell v. Littlejohn Transp.
Co., (La. 1942) IO S. (2d) 651.
18 An interesting case on this point is Glimvill v. Stacey, 6 B. & C. 541, 108 Eng.
Rep. 551 (1827). This was an action to collect tithes from the defendant. The defendant had paid tithes from the part of his crop harvested and collected by him,
but the plaintiff claimed tithes in rakings which were left upon the ground in the
course of harvesting the crop. In the argument, early cases were cited in which rakings
were exempted from the payment of tithes on the ground of the maxim, de minimis
non curat lex, except where the rakings were; through intent or deceit, abnormally
large. It was admitted in this case that the defendant was guilty of no fraud or intent
to deprive the parson of his tithes and that the mode of harvesting employed by him
was that usually employed in the vicinity. But the Court said that"•.• a_ course of harvesting, by which so large a portion is not subjected to the tithing, even when great
care is taken .•• operates in itself as a deceit . • .," and held that plaintiff was entitled to the tithe of that left after the first raking; that quantity left after the second
raking was "probably too small to be worthy of attention."
·79 Billingsly v. Groves, 5 Ind. 553 (1854); Valentine v. McGrath, 4 Alaska 102
(1910); Lumaghi Coal Co. v. Helvering, (C.C.A. 8th, 1942) 124 F. 645.
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advertence. 80 Very often the important feature to the court in applying
de mimmis is "lack of intent." 81 There are many decision,s in de minimis cases which can only be reconciled by the difference in the factor
of "intent" which was present and considered by the courts.82
An early New Jersey case contains tJ:ie following statement on
intent:
" ... Any intentional change is substantial; that variance only
is disregarded, which may occur where there is the intent and exercise of an honest effort to reach identity. The law regards not
trifles." 83
The many cases previously cited and discussed herein in· connection with the use of de minimis in appeals 8 ¾ illustrate a situation where
"intent" is often considered as a factor along with "practicality." In
Mitchell v. Littlejohn 85 there was an error of $1.95 in computing the
judgment in compensation proceedings. On appeal the court said:

"In view of the good faith of the defendant, the purpose and
motive prompting this deduction, though done in error, and the
trivial amount involved, we feel justified in affirming the judgment rendered below. Plaintiff's contention is sufficiently answered by the maxim 'de minimis non curat lex-.'" 86

In other cases of this type it has been held that an error, no matter how small, caused by the misdirection of the trial judge cannot be
overlooked,87 although in one case the court looked at the problem
from the other side and said that if the error is caused by the court,
8
°Cassino v. Yacevich, 261 App. Div. 685, 27 N.Y.S. (2d) 95 (1941); O'Grady
v. Barnhisel, 23 Cal. 287 (1863); Van Clief v. Van Vechten, 130 N.Y. 571, 29 N.E.
1017 (1892).
81
Kullman v. Greenebaum, 92 Cal. 403, 28 P. 674 (1891); Slaughter v. First
Nat. Bank, 109 Ala. 157, 19 S. 430 (1895).
82
This is demonstrated by comparing Embrey v. Owen, 6 Exch. 353, 155 Eng.
Rep. 579 (1851), with Webb v. The Portland Mfg. Co., (C.C. 1838) 3 Sumn. 189.
In the former a small diversion of water as part of a reasonable use for irrigation and
without any intention to injure the lower riparian owners was upheld, but in the latter
case a small diversion which by design carried the water around plaintiff's mill was
prohibited. See also 44 A.L.R. 168 at 191 (1926).
88
Johnson v. Jaqui, 27 N.J. Eq. 552 at 555 (1876).
8
¾ Supra, note 68.
·
85
(La. 1942) IO S. (2d) 651.
86
Id. at 655.
87
Boyden v. Moore, Admx., 5 Mass. 365 (1809); Brewer v. Tyringham, 12
Pick. (29 Mass.) 547 (1832).
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" .•. it can in no sense be considered as a conscious and intended
dereliction by the defendant, and the maxim de minimim [sic ]
is clearly applicable." 88
Thus, because de minimis non curat lex is basically a rule of reason,
the presence or absence of "intent" is important evidence to be con◄
sidered in determining the reasonableness of the situation to which the
maxim is to be applied.
,
D. Mutuality. Inherent in all applications of de ·minimis, as
in the application of all other legal principles, is the availability of the
principle to _either party. In refusing to reverse. a judgment on appeal
for a technical error the courts do not look to see if it is the plaintiff or
the defendant who is seeking reversal.89 By the factor of "mutuality,"
however, is meant more than this underlying principle of even handed
justice. "Mutuality" is the factor considered in the particular situations
in which the courts apply de minimis in favor of one party because, in
the same situations, it is also applied against hini.90
Such a situation is found in Blackstone's discussion of the rules of
law applicable to alluvion and dereliction:
"And as to lands gained from the sea, either by alluvion, by
the washing-up of sand and earth, so as in time to make terra firma
· (firm land); or by dereliction, as when,the se;l, shrinks back below
the usual watermark; in these cases the law is held to be, 'that if
this gain be by little and little, by small and imperceptible degrees,
it shall go to t!ie owner of the land adjoining. For de minimis non
curat lex and, besides, these owners, being often Josers by the
breaking in of the sea, or at charges to keep it out, this possible
gain is, therefore, a reciprocal consideration for such possible
charge or loss." 91
The portal-to-portal claims have given rise to counter claims for
peri9ds of productive time allegedly devoted by employees to per88 Jones v. Backus & Rogers, (Pa. S. Ct. 1886) 18 Wkly. N.C. 556 at 560; 44
A.L.R. 168vt 178 (1926).
89
See cases cited supra, note 66.
90
O'Grady v. Barnhisel, 23 Cal. 287 (1863); Rixey's Admr. v. Moorehead, 79
Va. 575 (1884); Cameron v. Bendix Aviation Corp., (D.C. Pa. 1946) 65 F. Supp.
510.
91
2 BLACKST. CoMM. 262. The same rule is stated in 1 BRAcToN, DE LEGIBUs,
Twiss ed., 69 (1878). Followed in Warren v. Chambers, 25 Ark. 120 (1867);
Adams v. Frothingham, 3 Mass. 352 (1807); Knudsen v. Omanson, 10 Utah
124, 37 P. 250 (1894). This is the general rule in almost all jurisdictions, although
de minimis is not always mentioned in stating it. 71 A.L.R. 1256 (1931). The Michigan Supreme Court adopted the rule in 1930, overruling previous contrary decisions.
Hilt v. Weber, 252 Mich. 198, 233 N.W. 159 (1930).
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sonal pursuits, tardiness and loafing.92 In this field the courts undoubtedly will accord much weight to the "mutuality" factor. In
Pollak v. Danbury Mfg. Co.98 the court applied de mininus to claims
of this nature made by an employer, saying:
". . • even where the servant occupies a position of authority
and _responsibility, he is still subject to the same obligation of
obedience to the reasonable orders of the master, for it is the right
of the master to manage his business as he pleases. To this statement we have only to add that, under the universal principle,
de m-minus non curat lex, there may, of course, be derelictions of
duty by the servant so trivial ,or inconsequential that the law will
not take note of them. The trial judge ought to have instructed
the jury in accordance with these principles." 9 '
A recent application of the "mutuality" factor in a suit brought
under the Fair Labor Standards Act is found in the decision in Cameron v. Bendix Aviation Corp.95 This decision on the problem of pay
for time spent waiting to punch the time clock, was apparently considered acceptable authority by the United States Supreme Court in the
Mt. Clemens Pottery Company case,9° although the problem was not
present in that case. In the Cameron case the court said:
. ·ccI accept these statements as correctly interpreting the intent
and purposes of the Act. The Act deals with human beings, not
machines. Under ordinary conditions of factory employment there
are minute fractions of the working day necessarily, and sometimes unnecessarily, lost both to e,nployer and employee, which,
on a strictly dollar and cents basis, are waste. The record of this
case shows that it was not customary for the employer to deduct
periods of a minute ( sometimes more) from an employee's time
on every occasion upon which it might have done so. For example,
the time cards showed a number of days when the employees
punched in a minute late in the morning for which no deduction
from their pay was made. It also appears that, after lunch, most
92
The record before the district court and the United States Supreme Court in
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, supra, note 1, contained undisputed testimony to the effect that the employees spent 25 to 30 minutes daily in personal pursuits
(Record U.S. S. Ct., p. 1175 and pp. 1282-1294). The Supreme Court on rehearing did not "deem it necessary to touch upon" the question of off-setting this time
against walking time.
98
103 Conn. 553; 131 A. 426 (1925).
9
'Id. at 558.
95
(D.C. Pa. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 510, 6 W. H. Cases 24.
96
328 U.S. 680 at 691, 66 S. Ct. 1187 (1946).
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of the employees usually punched in some time before the end of
the lunch period, so that the time clock gave no indications of the
precise time when they reported for work, and there seem to be a
number of occasions when they were a minute or two late in getting· back to their desks at I :r5, for which lost time no deduction
was made. Unless this was a unique establishment, there were
many other occasions during working hours when minutes were
lost to the employer in one way or another, as to which it did not
impose a penalty. To interpret the Act any more strictly than the
Administrator himself has done, it seems to me, would lead to the
elimination of all reasonable human give-and-take adjustments on
both sides, and would probably be more detrimental, in the long
run, to the interests of the employees than to those of the employer." 97
.

When considering the "mutuality" factor in applying de minimis
as an aid in interpreting a rule.of law, the court should, therefore, endeavor to reach a construction which ·operates equally and fairly on all
parties and in all similar situations.
·,
E. 1Value. The foregoing discussion indicates that in many instances of the use of de minimis an important factor is "value." In
some of the cases it almost seems that "value" was the only factor
considered,98 but a closer examination of these cases and a comparison
of them with similar cases demonstrates that, at the most, "value" was
the only factor that needed to be considered. If "value" were the only
factor, then the de minimis cases would be in hopelesS' conflict and con. fusion.
The cases involving errors in computing taxes,99 errors in computing judgments or verdic;:ts 100 and errors in attachments, levies and executions,101 are cases which, on first impression, seem to turn on a consideration of monetary values. On second thought,· however, these
values are seen to be really evidence pointing out the "purpose" and
"practicality" factors also involved. 102 In the cases of "positive and
-wrongful invasion of another's .property" 103 quantitative values are
·unimportant and the right violated is the important thing. In cases
97

(D.C. Pa. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 510 at 511.
See note 70, supra.
99
Supra, notes 47 and 48.
100
Supra, note 68.
101
Supra, notes 47 and 48.
102
See discussions of these factors, supra, pp. 545 et seq. and 5 5 I et seq.
108
Supra, note 59.
98
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such as the building contract cases,104 patent and copyright cases,100 and
other contract cases,106 the courts are seeking the meaning of "substantial" and the values are at most comparative, as they are in cases where
the values are expressed in percentages.107
The "value" factor is discussed in In re United Light and Power
Co.,1° 8 a case arising under the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935,100 as follows:
"It seems to me a powerful argumept for court approval of a
plan of distribution of the property of a public utility holding
company when not only the commission recommends, but also
where the pla,n is considered by practically all the owners of such
property to be fair and equitable. The interest behind the Io preferred shares of the dissidents, when compared with the 5 % allocation to all the common shareholders, might very well fall into
the realm of de minimis. Such a view brings a rule of life into a
rule of law." 110
"Value" was considered unimportant, however, in Smith v. Bradlee,111 a suit by a shareholder against the directors of a corporation. The
court said:
"Nor does the circumstance that the common shareholderplaintiffs own but a few shares of that common stock make the
maxim de minimis non curat lex applicable, for, in an. action
brought and prosecuted in autre droit, neither the proportion nor
the value of the plaintiffs' holdings of stock is relevant to the right
of action." 112
The "value" which the courts are considering, therefore, is an indefinite term. It includes absolute values m and relative values,114
104

Supra, note 54.'
Supra, note 46.
108
Supra, note 54.
107
Supra, note 46.
108
(D.C. Del. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 217.
109
49 Stat. L. 838, 15 U.S.~. (1940) § 79.
110
(D.C. Del. 1943) 51 F. Supp. 217 at 225.
111
(N.Y. S. Ct. 1942) 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 512.
112
Id. at 519.
118
Smith v. Bradlee, (N.Y. S. Ct. 1942) 37 N.Y.S. (2d) 512; Rose v. State,
(Cal. 1940) 105 P. (2d) 302.
114
Kullman v. Greenebaum, 92 Cal. 403, 28 P. 674 (1891); J. L. Brandeis &
Sons v. N.L.R.B., (C.C.A. 8th, 1944) 142 F. (2d) 977; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12
(1867).
105
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monetary vames 115 and human values,116 public values 111 and private
values.118 Actually, it is submitted, the use of "values" in de minimis
cases is as evidence indicative of the reasonableness of the interpretation
of the rule of law involved, as this interpretation is presented to or
adopted by the courts. Thus the values are often expressed in terms of
money, distance, weight, time or other quantitative terms because there
is no other way to designate them, but the means must .n.ot be confused
with the end.

. III
RIGHT OF ACTION OR DAMAGES?

Some of the confusion in the de minimis cases seems to arise out of.
an attempt to use the maxim solely as a rule of damages, whereas it is
more properly used in determining whether or not a right of action
exists. 119 The maxim has been used to deny recovery where it is clear
that a right of action exists,120 but more often, if there is no question
· as to tpe existence of a right of action, the maxim is said to be inapplicable.121 In many other cases it is clear that the application of the
maxim has had the effect of denying the existence of a right of action.122
As appears from the quotations at the beginning of this article, the
earliest uses of the de minimis principle in both the Civil Law and the
Common Law involved the problem of whether or not a right of action
was to be granted, and the principle was applied to deny a right of
action in stated sirua:tions.
The case of Doremus v. City of Paterson 123 clearly emphasizes this
use of de minimis. This was a proceeding to assess damages against the
city for polluting a river and lake by emptying sewage into it. The
city claimed a prescriptive right to pollute the river and lake by reason
115

Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 292 U.S. 398, 64
S. Ct. 763 (1933).
116
Wilkerson v. The St~te, 13 Mo. 92 (1850)..
117
Fairbanks v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 21 S. Ct. 648 (1901).
118
Duhain v. Mermod, Jaccard & King J. Co., 73 Miss. 423, 131 N.Y.S. II
(19II); 2 BLACKST. CoMM. 262, and alluvion cases cited supra, note 91.
119
By right of action is also meant breach of duty. or contract in ·situations where
the defense is based upon a breach· of duty, by the plaintiff, as in Cassino v. Yacevich,
261 App. Div. 684, 27 N,-Y.S. (2d) 95 (1941).
12°For example, appeal cases, supra, note 68; trespass cases, supra, note 60; tax
cases, supra, note 48.
121 Supra, note 59.
122 For example, waste cases, supra, note 19; stream cases, supra, note 58; contract cases, supra, note 54; encroachment cases, supra, note 57.
12s 73 N.J. Eq. 474 (1908).
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. of having emptied sewage into them, without objection or hindrance,
for more than the statutory period. It thus became necessary for the
court to determine when actionable pollution of the river and lake
began. In so doing the court considered much expert testimony on the
flow of water required to absorb and purify given quantities of sewage.
The court finally arrived at a determination of:
"· .. the summer of 1892 as the time when the water had certainly become sensibly and injuriously polluted. The maxim
de minimis would probably apply to the time previous." m
This date was too recent to support the creation of a prescriptive
right in this case. So, though sewage had been emptied into the river
many years before 1892, no right of action accrued until 1892 when
the amount of sewage became no longer de minimis.
To revert to the analysis herein by factors, in some cases the
"value" and "practicality" factors are such that the effect of the application of de minimis is synonymous with infuria sine dammo, while in
other cases the "intent," "purpose" and "pra~ticality" factors are so
important that de minimis is used to arrive at a conclusion of dammum

absque injuria.
The cases which have been cited and discussed in this article show
that if a right of action exists, de minimis is applied very grudgingly,
if at all, but that where de minimis is used as an aid in establishing or
denying a right of action in the first instance, it is more generously used.
It becomes important, then, to decide which type of problem is presented.

IV
THE MAXIM IN PoRTAL-To-PoRTAL LITIGATION

By "portal-to-portal litigation" 125 is meant the many suits,126
apparently based upon the decision in the case of Anderson v. Mt.
Clemens Pottery Company,121 which h~e been filed in the past few
months. It is these suits which, according to the Mt. Clemens decision,
involve "the application of a de minimis rule." The decisions in the
1

Id. at 485.
Called "gate-to-gate" in the pamphlet published by the Bureau of National
Affairs, You& WoRKING TIME PROBLEM UNDER THE WAGE & Hou& LAW (1946).
126
Newspaper releases state that over $5,000,000,000 of such suits have been filed.
The Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division (Detroit) had 175 such suits
on its docket, as of March 20, 1947.
127
Supra, note I.
24,

125
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earlier and true "portal-to-portal" suits in the iron 128 and coal 129
mining industries made no mention of de minimis. This is presumably because the distances traveled in each case,180 the unsafe conditions
of travel, and the time involved obviated the applicability of de mini-mis. However, where the facts so indicate, there is, of course, nothing
to prevent the consideration of de minimis in any type of "portal-toportal" problem.131
Patently, the most pertinent decision on the applicability of the
maxim in portal-to-portal litigation is the Mt. Clemens decision itself.
It is important, therefore, to examine this decision to determine first, if
de minimis was used as a limitation on the existence of a right of action
or as a limitation on damages, and, second, whether any specific finding
was made as to what period of time was or was not de minimis.
As to the first problem, the majority opinion delivered by Justice
Murphy began as follows:
"Several important issues are raised by this case concerning
the proper determination of working time for purposes of the
Fair Labor Standards Act of r938 ...." 132
The opinion then proceeded to outline the factual picture, the history of the controversy, and the findings and decisions of the master,
• the district court 133 and the circuit court of appeals.134 It was then held
that the circuit court of appeals, and the master, had imposed upon the
employees "an improper standard of proof," and that "an employee
has carried out his b1.:trden if he proves that he has in fact performed
work for which he was improperly compensated...." Turning to the
128

Tennessee Coal Co. v. Muscoda Local, 321 U.S. 590, 64 S. Ct. 698 (1944).
Jewell Ridge Co. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161, 65 S. Ct. 434 (1945).
180
In the Tennessee Coal Co. case, the men rode in mine cars 3,000 to 12,000
feet and then walked up to two miles.- 321 U.S. 590 at 596. In the Jewell Ridge Co.
case, the men rode in mine cars 4,250 to 25,460 feet and then walked 500 to 1,500
feet. 325 U.S. 161 at 164.
181
Recent reports tell of a coal mine in Ohio with a passenger elevator, cement
lined corridors in which to walk fro~ the elevator, and an underground eating and
recreation room. Here de minimis might find application. In the Tennessee Coal Co.
case the activities of the miners on the surface from the time they came upon the employer's premises until they reached the portal of the mine (activities similar to those
in surface industries such as obtaining and returning lamps and tools and checking in
and out) were held not compensable working time by the circuit court of appeals
because of the "practical difficulties" of computation, and no appeal was taken from this
portion of the decision. The Supreme Court said, ."These activities consume but a few
minutes." 321 U.S. 590 at 595·
132
66 S. Ct. II87 at II90 (1946).
188
(D.C. Mich. 1943) 60 F. Supp.146.
184
(C.C.A. 6th, 1945) 149 F. (2d) 461.
129
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facts of the case, Justice Murphy agreed with the master in his determination that no uncompensated productive work was proved and that
the time clocks did not record the actual time worked by the employees. The proofs did show, however, that the employees were "on
the premises for some time prior and subsequent to the scheduled
working hours," during which they punched-in, walked to their work
benches and performed preliminary activities. It was then said:
". . . Since the statutory workweek includes all time during
which an employee is necessarily required to be on the employer's
premises, on duty or at a prescribed workplace, the time spent in
these activities must be accorded appropriate compensation." 185
and
"· •. It follows that the time spent in walking to work on the
employer's premises, after the time clocks were punched, involved
'physical or mental exertion ( whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the employer and pursued necessarily and
primarily for the benefit of the employer and his business.'
• . . Work of that character must be included in the statutory
workweek and compensated accordingly, regardless of contrary
custom or contract.
" ..• But under the conditions prevalent in respondent's plant,
compensable working time was limited to the minimum time
necessarily spent in walking at an ordinary rate along the most
direct route from time clock to work bench." 136
A similar, but abbreviated, discussion as to preliminary activities
after arriving at the work bench was set forth, with the conclusion:
".:. Hence they constitute work that must be accorded appropriate compensation under the statute." 137
From these portions -of the opinion it might appear thaf the Supreme Court intended to rule that the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938 138 created a right of action for all uncompensated walking time
and preliminary activities, as defined in the Mt. Clemens case.w9 But
the opinion did not stop with the above quoted holdings. It went on to
state, as to walking time:
185

66 S. Ct. 1187 at 1194 (1946).
lbid.
1s1 Id. at n95.
188
52 Stat. L. 1060, § 7(a), 29 U.S.C. (1940) § 207(a).
139
And the Tennessee Coal Co., 321 U.S. 590, 64 S. Ct. 698 (1944), and Jewell
Ridge Co., 325 U.S. 161, 65 S. Ct. 434 (1944), cases, supra, notes 123 and 124.
186
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"We do not, of course, preclude the application of a de minimis rule where the minimum walking time is such as to be negligible. The workweek contemplated by § 7 (a) must be computed
in light of the realities of the industrial world. When the matter
in issue concerns only a few seconds or minutes of work beyond
the scheduled working hours, such trifles may be disregarded.
Split-second absurdities are rtot justified by the actualities of
working conditions or by the policy of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. It is only when an employee is required to give up a substantial measure of his time and effort that compensable working
time is involved. The de minimis rule can doubtless be applied
to much of the walking time involved in this case,.but the precise
scope of that application can be determined only after the trier of
the facts makes more definite findings as to the amount of walking time in issue.'' 140
and as to preliminary activities:
"Here again, however, it is appropriate to apply a de minimis
doctrine so that insubsta?Jtial and ipsignificant periods of time
spent in preliminary activities need not be included in the statutory workweek.m41
Comparing this decision \as a whole, and particularly the above
quoted portions dealing with de minimis, with the statements and decisions ~et forth in this article, from the earliest Civil Law and Common Law sources down to the present date, in which de minimis was
used as an aid in determining the existence or non-existence of a right
of action, it is a fair conclusion that the same use of de minimis was
made by the United States Supreme Court in the Mt. Clemens case.
No other explanation seems reasonable for the above quoted statements,
especially the italicized portions thereof.
Justice Murphy's order of remand also makes it appear that the
proper use to be made of de minimis in the portal-to-portal situations
is as a limitation on the existence of a right of action and not as a limitation on damages. This order reads:
"Thus we remand the case for the determination of the
amount of walking time involved and the amount of preliminary
activities performed, giving due consideration to the de minimis
doctrine, and calculating the resulting damages under the Act." 142
140

1talics supplied. 66 S. Ct. 1187 at n95 (1946).
Ibid. Italics· supplied.
142
Id. at 1195.
141
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If de mimmis were to be applied only as a rule of damages, the
order should have read:
Thus we remand the case for the determination of the amount
of walking time involved and the amount of preliminary activities performed, and calculating the resulting damages under the
Act giving due consideration to the de minimis doctrine.
As previously stated, if the determination of the existence of a right
of action is the problem to which de minimis non curat lex is to be applied in the portal-to-portal litigation, the precedents justify a more
generous application of this maxim than if damages are the only
problem.
The district court 148 to which the case was remanded by the above
order, said:
". • • nor are we concerned with the question of whether the
time spent in 'preliminary activities' or 'walking' are compensable.
The holding of the Supreme Court in this case is that they are
compensable subject to the 'de minimis' rule and 'in light of the
realities of the industrial world.' "144
•
'

And in discussing the Tennessee Coal and Jewell Ridge Company
cases the court questioned how anybody could claim,
"· .. that walking time of the type and amount involved in.
this case can be considered as compensable 'in light of the realities
of the industrial world'?" 145
These statements embodied in an opinion which denied recovery
indicate that de minimis was used in that case to deny the existence of a
right of action.
On the second problem, the district court did not decide that any
finding was made by the Supreme Court in the Mt. Clemens case as to
what period of time was or was not de minimis. The district court
concluded that, under any theory, all of the walking and preliminary
activities time involved in that case was de minimis. In addition, the
district court stated that:
". • • we would not go lower than r 2 minutes as above restricted ( the minority opinion indicates that IO minutes would
surely be de minimis) and without setting any de mimmis figure
148

Eastern District of Michigan, Southern Division, Judge Frank A. Picard.
69 F. Supp. 710 at 713 (1947).
145
Id. at 719.

144
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herein, hold all the walking and preliminary activities time consumed in this case is de minimis." 146
and that:
"From the above 147 1t 1s apparent that this court not only
could but should, by the great weight of -what authorities there
are, declare all walking and preliminary activities time involved
in this case as de minimis." 148
The following statement in the opinion of Justice Murphy was
advanced as the basis for the argument that a specific finding was made
by the Supreme Court as to the amount of time which was de minimis:
"Those arrangements in this case compelled the employees to
spend an estimated 2 to 12 minutes daily, if not more, in walking
on the premises." 149
The only other basis for this contention is the fact that the case was
remanded, thereby implying that there was compensable time involved beyond the scope of de minimis. Neither basis, however, seems
very strong when it is remembered_ that the Mt. Clemens case did not
originate and was not presented as a portal-to-portal case before the
- master, the district court, or the circuit court of appeals. The district
court on rehearing was very careful to point this out and to conclude
that the portal-to-portal issue was first injected into the case in the employees' petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court.150
Before the master, the plaintiff employees tended to minimize the
walking time and preliminary activities in support of their contention
that all time ·shown on the time cards was working time, a portion of
which had not been paid-for. To meet this contention the defendant
company emphasized the time consumed by employees (both necessarily and unnecessar.ily) in walking and preliminary activities, in explanation of the time shown on the time cards which was in excess of
the actual "whistle to whistle" time on the basis of which the employees
were paid. 151 It is readily apparent that the Supreme Court, in a case
146

147

Ibid.
For rulings and cases relied on by the district court, on rehearing, see supra,

note 45.
148

69 F. Supp. 710 at 718 (1947).
66
Ct. II87 at 1194 (1946).
150
69 F. Supp. 710 at 711-713 (1947).
151 Two· other elements increase the general factual confusion in this case and
make it difficult to assay its full value as a precedent in other cases. The first of these
factors is that this defendant operated a piece-work factory and the plaintiffs were paid
solely on a piece-work basis. Therefore, the_ keeping of time had no relation, except
in cases of overtime, to the wages paid. Time was kept primarily to comply with the
149

s:
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tried on these theories, was not likely to make any specific decision as
to time involved and as to what was or was not de minimis under the
portal-to-portal theory. It seems reasonable to conclude that on this
"chameleonic pattern of the factual fabric" 152 the Supreme Court intended only to lay down the applicable general principles. The district
· court, as indicated, took some further testimony, heard arguments and
decided that all time involved in the case was de minimis.158

V
CONCLUSIONS

At least until a body of specific precedent is built up by decisions
in some of these cases, the courts in applying de minimis non curat lex
to portal-to-portal situations will have to resort to a very large extent
to general principles derived from other types of cases.
The historical development of the maxim shows its function to be
as a rule of reason. In Cameron v. Bendix Aviation Corporation the
court said:
"The true test is whether the employee was unreasonably
deprived of time which he should have had free ...." 154
The maxim is to be used in these portal-to-portal situations to determine when a right of action to recover for uncompensated compensable working time has arisen under the Fair Labor Standards Act.
"It is only where an employee is required to give up a substantial measure 9f his time and effort that compensable working
time is involved." 155
Fair Labor Standards Act. The piece-work rate paid was sufficiently high so that even
if the plaintiffs established their full claim as to time worked they had received single
time compensation therefor, and would be entitled only to one-half time and the statutory penalty (section 16). Furthermore, although employees would gain the retroactive
lump sum payment they sought, they would lose in the future. Any diminishing of
the production time so as to get it and the walking and preliminary activities time
within eight hours would only dept-ive the employees of pay since they would be unable
to produce as many pieces on each shift. The coal miners, also piece rate workers, did
·not face this problem as they were already on a seven hour day and so could add travel
time without losing any actual working time. (See dissent in Jewell Ridge Co. case).
The second peculiar element in the Mt. Clemens case was the claim originally
made of 56 minutes of uncompensated work consisting of 14 minutes each at morning
in, noon out, noon in, and evening out The lunch hour was 30 minutes, yet the
plaintiffs claimed they worked 28 minutes of it!
m 69 F. Supp. 710 at 713 (1947).
153
Supra, note 144.
lH (D.C. Pa. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 510 at 512.
1115
Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery Company, (U.S. 1946) 66 S. Ct. n87 at

u95.
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As for the "purpose" factor, the United States Supreme Court has
decided that "working time" under the Fair Labor Standards Act includes "substantial" and significant periods of walking and preliminary activities time.156 Whether or not that interpretation agrees with
one's ideas of the purpose of the act is not here relevant. But in applying de minimis to decide when substantial time is involved, the purpose
of the overtime provision [ section 7 (a)] of the act, which is said to be
to spread employment and curtail exhausting work schedules,157 should
be considered.158 In addition, the reasonableness and the private purposes ( safety of the ymployees, convenience of employees' tr~nsportation, or convenience of an employer's special accounting system, convenience of an employer's plant protection program) of the arrangements at the employer's premises which give rise to the walking and
preliminary activities time should be given consideration.159
The presence and import of the "practicality" factor in the portalto-portal problems is obvious. As has previously been pointed out, the
decision of the Supreme Court in the Mt. Clemens case stated specifically that this factor should be considered in applying de ·minimis in
these cases. On this point the district court, on rehearing in the Mt.
Clemens case, said:
"It was in the light of all the realities of the industrial world,
not only part, that we have attempted to decide this case." 160 •
"Intent" is another factor which is of obvious importance in the
portal-to-portal litigation. The size of the ad damnum clauses in the
complatnts filed indicates either that industry did not know that it was
violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, or that, as organized labor has
claimed,161 it was taking a colossal gamble on not being caught. Whichever view is taken, however, would seem to indicate that, at least as to
retroactive claims, de minimis should be liberally applied in accordance
with the general principles set out herein under "intent." If the defendant employer was acting in good faith, as the district court found
0

156

Ibid.
Jewell Ridge Co. v. Local No. 6167, 325 U.S. 161 at 167, 65 S. Ct. 434
(1945).
'
158
For example, if the walking and preliminary activities time would not increase
employment if considered part of the workweek, it may be held' de minimis. It seems
especially clear that extensive retroactive claims can have little relationship to these
purposes, at least where ~e employer acted in good faith.
159
See infra, remaining conclusions.
160
69 F. Supp. 710 at 722 (1947).
181
Brief filed with the district court, on rehearing in the Mt. Clemens case, on
behalf of the C.I.O. national organization, as amicus curiae.
157
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to be true in the Mt. Clemens case 162 then only large amounts of uncompensated walking and preliminary activities time, occasioned by
unreasonable regulations and arrangements made by the employer,
should be recognized as a basis for recovery. If the defendant employer
was taking a gamble and acting with knowledge that he was violating
the act, then, as the general principles indicate, he has no right to ·
rely on a generous use of de nunimis in his favor. On the other hand,
if the employees knowingly allowed the situation to continue for years
without objection, meanwhile negotiating contracts where the issue
could have been raised, then they also are guilty of gambling and are'
not entitled to expect an application of de nunimis against the employer.
As to future claims, the "intent" factor will largely be one of implied
"intent," as in the tithes cases,168 arising out of the reasonableness of the
situation an~ the tendency of the arrangements as an unnecessary
burden on the employee or an undue benefit to the employer.164
The quotation from the Cameron case 165 is a clear demonstration
of the importance of the "mutuality" factor in applying de nunimis non
curat lex in "working time" cases. To the same effect is the following
from the opinion of the district court on rehearing in the Mt. Clemens
case:
"We ought to have in mind always that we are in great part an
industrial nation where very recently mass production and fair
relations between capital and labor served us so well; that we
should look upon labor and ·industry as a team pulling in the
same direction, or as husband and wife where the give or the take
is not all on one side." 166
Since neither the Supreme Court nor the district court can be said
to have made any specific determination as to what time was not
de nunimis in the Mt. Clemens case, they did not set any upper limit
to be expressed in quantitative terms of value. The district court held
merely that at least 2 minutes of preliminary activities and 6.2 minutes
of walking time was de minimis. Both opinions clearly indicated that
the "value" factor could not be given a flat figure to apply to all cases.
162
69 F. Supp. 710 at 720 (1947). The district court held that even if it was
wrong on de minimis,. the employer, having acted in good faith in reliance on the approval and rulings of the Administrator of the Wage and Hour Law, should be spared
by an application of "the doctrine of retroactivity."
168
Supra, note 78.
1
u. See preceding quotation from opinion of Justice Murphy.
165
Supra, note 97.
106
69 F. Supp. 710 at 721-722 (1947).
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In fact they did not even give a :Hat figure to apply to this one case. It
is submitted that the "value" factor properly to be considered in the
portal-to-portal litigation is to be expressed in terms of burden imposed ,upon the employee and benefit gained by the employer by the
arrangements made and provided for getting the employee into and on
the employer's premises and at his work place, actually engaged in
those activities known as his "job."

